\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
\usepackage[colorlinks=true, linkcolor=black, urlcolor=blue, pdfborder={0 0 0}]{hyperref}
%\usepackage{fullpage}
\usepackage{vmargin}
\setpapersize{A4}
%% the arguments to \setmarginsrb are as follows (note that the distance from
%% the top of the page to the first line of (non-header) text is
%% top margin + head height + head separator:
%% \setmarginsrb{leftmargin}{topmargin}{rightmargin}{bottommargin}%
%%              {headheight}{headsep}{footheight}{footskip}
\setmarginsrb{25mm}{25mm}{25mm}{25mm}%
             {0pt}{0mm}{10pt}{10mm}
\usepackage{setspace}
\doublespacing

\begin{document}

\begin{center}{\em
	Mind as socially constituted \\
	Andreas van Cranenburgh \\
	\today
}\end{center}


%\begin{quote}
%	``No man is an island, entire of itself" -- John Donne
%\end{quote}

I want to argue that the findings of shared intentionality call for a different
philosophy of mind. One that is not individualistic and recognizes how social
interactions are constitutive of the mind. The mind is not just what the brain
does, it is what emerges from being immersed in interactions with others.

Most contemporary philosophy of mind claims that brains cause or are minds.
This position is too narrow, because it only connects mind to the subpersonal
level. I will posit that the brain, as the subpersonal level, together with
the social environment, as the supra-personal level, jointly form mind. Mind
is thus derivative from culture and organism, rather than an independent
substance, place or realm.

%As shared intentionality shows,
%
%\begin{quote}
%	"[B]efore we are in a position to theorize, simulate, explain or
%	predict mental states in others, we are already in a position to
%	interact with and to understand others in terms of their expressions,
%	gestures, intentions, and emotions, and how they act toward ourselves
%	and others." -- Gallagher \& Zahavi (2008)
%\end{quote}
%
%This implies that our most basic way of interacting with others is
%one that is not mediated by cognizing and ratiocination.

To support this alternative philosophy of mind I will look at two proponents of
a social conception of mind: Vygotsky and Wittgenstein.
Vygotsky established cultural-historical psychology which argues that higher
mental processes have their origin in social processes and are acquired through
internalization.  Wittgenstein, in Schatzki's account, sees the mind as
conditions of life expressed by the body. Mind is how things stand and are
going for someone.  For both Wittgenstein and Vygotsky actions and practices
are crucial aspects. This is in contrast to the classical picture of the mind
as an information processing device.

After establishing this alternative view on mind I want to consider
consequences for philosophy of mind.
Firstly the concept of a mental state, which plays a fundamental but rarely
questioned role in philosophy of mind, is confused because it presumes
discreteness.  The mind-body problem is incorrectly formulated because it
ignores the role of life conditions, and because the mind is not causal.
Finally I think a social conception of mind provides an account of where
meaning comes from, namely cultural transmission.

\vspace{2em}
\begin{center}
$\infty$
\end{center}

\newpage

\subsection*{References}
\begin{description}
\item[]
Schatzki, Theodore R. (1996), Social Practices. A Wittgensteinian 
	approach to human activity and the social (chapters 2 \& 3).
	Cambridge University Press.

\item[]
Tomasello, Michael and Malinda Carpenter (2007), Shared intentionality, 
	Developmental Science 10:1, pp 121–125, Blackwell Publishing Ltd

\item[]
Tomasello, Micheal (1999), The cultural origins of human cognition,
	Harvard University Press.

\item[]
Vygotsky, Lev (1978), Mind in Society: the development of higher 
	psychological processes, Harvard University Press.

\item[]
Wertsch, J.V. (1985), Vygotsky and the social formation of mind,	
	Harvard University Press.
\end{description}

\end{document}

