General and Rational Grammar:

THE PORT-ROYAL GRAMMAR

by

ANTOINE ARNAULD AND CLAUDE LANCELOT

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GENERAL AND RATIONAL GRAMMAR

Grammar is the art of speaking.

Speaking is explaining one's thoughts by signs which men have invented for this purpose.

It has been found that the most useful of these signs are sounds and vocals.

But because these sounds are transitory, other signs were invented in order to make them lasting and visible; these are the characters of writing which the Greeks called γράμματα (grammata), whence comes the word *grammar*.

Thus one can consider two things in regard to these signs. First, what they are by their nature, that is to say, as sounds and characters.

Second, their signification, that is to say, the manner in which men utilize them for signifying their thoughts.

We will treat of the former in the first part of this grammar, and of the latter, in the second part.

I

THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT OCCURS IN OUR MINDS IS NECESSARY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF GRAMMAR; AND THAT ON THIS DEPENDS THE DIVERSITY OF WORDS WHICH COMPOSE DISCOURSE.[1]

Until now we have only considered the material element of speech, and that which is common, at least as far as sound is concerned, to both men and parrots.

It remains for us to examine the spiritual element of speech which constitutes one of the greatest advantages which man has over all the other animals, and which is one of the greatest proofs of man's reason.[2] This is the use which we make of it for signifying our thoughts, and this marvelous invention of composing from twenty-five or thirty sounds an infinite variety of words,[3] which

[1] This chapter title may be seen as expressing one of the fundamental conceptual themes of the *Grammar*, i.e. the rationalistic basis of grammar.

[2] The notion of the flexibility of language response as separating men from beasts is taken from Descartes. See for example the *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason*, Part V, where Descartes indicates the method by which we may "recognise the difference that exists between men and brutes.... It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same." *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), I, 116-17. For a full discussion of this aspect of Descartes' thought, see Noam Chomsky, *Cartesian Linguistics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 3ff., and *Language and Mind* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), Chapter 1.

[3] Chomsky sees the emphasis upon the fact that in the employment of language we "make infinite use of finite means", in Humboldt's locution, as well as the attempt to give an account of this creative potential, as one of the key contributions of the tradition of rationalistic linguistic theory or "Cartesian linguistics". He sees the *Grammar* as a major landmark in this tradition, in which he also places his own work. See *Cartesian Linguistics*, Chapter 1;

although not having any resemblance in themselves to that which passes through our minds, nevertheless do not fail to reveal to others all of the secrets of the mind, and to make intelligible to others who cannot penetrate into the mind all that we conceive and all of the diverse movements of our souls.

Thus words can be defined as distinct and articulate sounds which men have made into signs for signifying their thoughts.[4]

This is why the different sorts of signification which are embodied in words cannot be clearly understood if what has gone on in our minds previously has not been clearly understood, since words were invented only in order to make these thoughts known.

All philosophers teach that there are three operations of our minds: *conceiving*, *judging*, and *reasoning*.[5]

Conceiving is only the simple attention of the mind to things, either in a purely intellectual manner, as when I think of the notions of being, duration, thought, or God, or else accompanied by corporeal images, as when I imagine a square, a circle, a dog, or a horse.

Judging is the affirmation that a thing of which we conceive is

Language and Mind, Chapter 1; *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), Chapter 1; and *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory* (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), Chapter 1. See also Donzé, Chapter 1. For an interesting attack on Chomsky's view of Arnauld and Lancelot as "Cartesian", but as rather being pre-Cartesian, more directly influenced by Sanctius' *Minerva, sive de causis linguae latinae commentarius* (1587), see Robin Lakoff's review of H. Brekle's edition of the *Grammar*, in *Language* 45 (1969), 343ff., especially 355 and 363.

[4] The view that words are signs of thoughts represents a dominant theory in western philosophical thought not subject to serious criticism until the twentieth century. For a proto-typical account of the view of the relationship among words, thoughts and things which figured strongly in the intellectual heritage of Port-Royal, see Augustine's *De Magistro*.

[5] For detailed discussions of the "operations of the mind", see the Port-Royal Logic by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *La Logique ou l'Art de penser* (1662). A convenient recent French critical edition is that of Pierre Clair and François Girbal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965). A recent translation is that of James Dickoff and Patricia James, *The Art of Thinking: Port-Royal Logic* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). All subsequent references to this work will be to this English edition, and will be cited as *Logic*. Much of the material in this work bears on the *Grammar*.

such or is not such, as when, having conceived of what *the earth* is and what *roundness* is, I affirm of the earth that it is round.

Reasoning is the use of two judgments in order to make a third, as when, having judged that all virtue is laudable, and that patience is a virtue, I conclude that patience is laudable.

From whence it can be seen that the third operation of the mind is only an extension of the second. And thus it will suffice for our endeavor to consider only the first two operations or that part of the first which is contained in the second. For men scarcely speak simply to express what they conceive, but rather almost always in order to express the judgments which they make from the things which they conceive.

A judgment that we make about things, as when I say, *The earth is round*, is called a *proposition*, and thus every proposition necessarily embodies two terms: the first is called the *subject* and is that of which one predicates, as *earth* in the above example, and the second is called the *predicate* and is that which is predicated, as *round* in the above example. In addition to the terms, a proposition includes the connection between the two terms, the copula, *is*.

Now it is easy to see that the two terms properly belong to the first operation of the mind, because it is this which we conceive and which is the object of our thought, and that the connection belongs to the second operation, which could properly be termed the action of our minds, and the manner in which we think.

And thus the greatest distinction to be made about what occurs in our minds is to say that one can consider the object of our thought on the one hand, and the form or manner of our thought, the main form being judgment, on the other hand. But one must still relate to what occurs in our mind the conjunctions, disjunctions, and other similar operations of our minds, and all the other movements of our souls, such as desires, commands, questions, etc.

It follows from this that men, having had need of signs in order to mark everything that occurs in their minds, also found it necessary to draw a most general distinction among words into those that signify the objects of thoughts and those that signify

the form and the manner or mode of our thoughts, although the latter often do not signify the manner alone, but only the manner in conjunction with the object, as we will show.

Words of the first kind are those which are called *nouns*, *articles*, *pronouns*, *participles*, *prepositions*, and *adverbs*. Those of the second kind are *verbs*, *conjunctions*, and *interjections*. These are all derived as a necessary consequence from the natural manner in which we express our thoughts, as we will show.

II

OF NOUNS, AND FIRST OF SUBSTANTIVES AND ADJECTIVES[1]

The objects of our thoughts are either things, like the earth, the sun, water, wood, what is ordinarily called *substance*, or else are the manner or modification of things, like being round, being red, being hard,.being learned, what is called *accident*.

There is this difference between things or substances and the manner of things or accidents: substances exist by themselves, whereas accidents depend for their existence on substances.[2]

It is this which has engendered the principal difference among the words which signify the objects of thought. For those words which signify *substances* have been called *substantive nouns*,[3] and those which signify accidents, in marking the subjects in which these accidents inhere, have been called *adjectival nouns*.[4]

This then is the first origin of substantive and adjectival nouns. But the matter went beyond this consideration, and we find that it was not so much signification itself that was dwelt upon as the manner of signification. For since substance is that which exists by itself, people came to call all those words which exist by themselves in discourse without requiring another noun *substantive*

[1] This chapter is a clear example of the "deep-structural" analysis in which the authors are engaged. The distinctions drawn are conceptual rather than grammatical.

[2] The explicit acceptance of Aristotelian subject-predicate logic and substance-attribute metaphysics is clear in this passage. Cf. *Logic*, "Second Discourse", 26, where Arnauld asserts that "we acknowledge that nearly our whole treatment of the rules of logic is taken from [Aristotle's] *Analytics*".

[3] E.g. "earth" or "sun", *Logic*, 99.

[4] E.g. "good", "just", "round", *Logic*, 99.

nouns, even though they in fact signified accidents.[5] And on the contrary, those words which signified substances came to be called *adjectives* when, by their manner of signifying, they needed to be joined to other nouns in discourse.[6]

Now the reason that in certain instances a noun cannot exist by itself is that outside of its distinct signification, it also has a confused signification, which can be called the *connotation* of a thing, with which that which is marked by the distinct signification agrees.[7]

Thus the distinct signification of *red* is *redness* [*la rougeur*]. But *red* signifies redness by marking confusedly the subject of this redness, from whence it comes that *red* never exists by itself in discourse, because the word which signifies this subject must be either expressed or understood.[8]

Since this connotation forms the adjective, when it is removed from words which signify accidents, they are made into substantives, as from *colored*, *color*, from *red*, *redness*, from *hard*, *hardness*, from *prudent*, *prudence*, etc.[9]

[5] E.g. "wisdom", "whiteness", "color", *Logic*, 100.

[6] E.g. "human", "carnal", *Logic*, 100.

[7] The words "clear", "distinct", "confused", "obscure", are never adequately explained by the authors, and their meanings must be extrapolated from the contexts in which they appear. Some attempt is made to do this in the notes which follow. These notions were of course of great importance for all Cartesians. Descartes relies heavily upon them in the *Discourse on Method* and in the *Meditations*, but it is common knowledge that he gave no adequate account of them. For the best attempt to explicate these and related notions, see Leibniz' "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas" (1684) in P.P. Wiener (ed.), *Leibniz Selections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 283. These ideas were further developed by the Leibnizean Christian Wolff in his *Logic*.

[8] The theory seems to be this: Adjectival nouns like "red" distinctly signify a certain quality, expressed as a substantive, like redness. The confused signification, or connotation, of such adjectival nouns is the reference they have to those objects in which the quality appears; in the above example, those things which have the property of redness. Thus "red" only signifies "redness" (its distinct signification) by way of modifying some subject — i.e. we always talk of something being red. It is for this reason, argue the authors, that "red" never appears alone in discourse, but must always be accompanied by the word designating the thing which is red, expressed or understood.

[9] The confused connotation is thus the feature which is constitutive of a word's being an adjective, since the confused connotation is the reference to

And on the contrary, when one adds to words which signify substances this confused connotation or signification of a thing to which these substances are connected, adjectives are created, as out of *man*, *manly*, or, in French, out of *homme* (man), *humain* (human, adjective).[10]

The Greeks and the Latins have an infinite number of these words, *ferreus* (iron, adjective), *aureus* (golden), *bovinus* (bovine), *vitulinus* (calf, adjective), etc.

But Hebrew, French, and the other vernacular languages have fewer of these words. For French conveys this notion by use of the *de* (of): *d'or* (of gold), *de fer* (of iron), *de bœuf* (of beef), etc.

If these adjectives formed of substantive nouns are stripped of their connotation, new substantives called *abstracts* or *derivatives* are created. Thus, having made *human* from *homo*, or *humain* from *homme* one can make *humanity* from *human*, or *humanité* from *humain*.[11]

But there is another class of nouns which are considered substantives although these nouns are in fact adjectives, as they signify an accidental form, and since they also mark a subject to which this form is suitable. Such are the names of the various professions of men, like *king*, *philosopher*, *painter*, *soldier*, etc. And what makes

the things modified by the adjective, and thus to be an adjective, a word must connote something which is modified by it. Thus the adjectival function of "red" consists in our ability to fill in the blank in "a red ——" with the name of some object. Since nothing definite is indicated by the blank, the things which satisfy that schema are indicated only "confusedly".

[10] The addition of the confused connotation to words signifying substances creates an adjective, for it has the effect of indicating the subjects to which the quality or set of qualities or essence is attached.

[11] This argument is cryptic. If the adjective *humain* (human) is created out of the noun *homme* (man) by addition of the confused connotation, then it is difficult to see why stripping the confused connotation from *humain* results in the new substantive *humanité* (humanity) rather than in the original substantive *homme* (man). It is possible that the authors saw *man* and *humanity* as equivalent, but this seems unlikely. Alternatively, *man* may here designate the essence or substantial form and thus be an intensional notion, wile *humanity* may designate the class or totality of men and thus be an extensional notion, and if this is the case, it seems that the authors did not have a clear notion, and if this is the case, it seems that the authors did not have a clear notion of this distinction here. Cf. below Part II, Chapter 10, n. 2.

these nouns pass for substantives is that they can only have man as a subject, at least in ordinary circumstances and according to the primary usage of nouns. It has not been necessary to join their substantive to them, because one can understand without any confusion that the connection cannot be made with any other substantive. And for this reason these words have had in usage what is peculiar to substantives, that is, to exist alone in discourse.

It is for this same reason that certain nouns or pronouns are said to be taken substantively, because they are connected to a substantive so general that it is understood easily and precisely as *triste lupus stabulis*[12] (the wolf is terrible to the flocks), supply by subaudition *negotium* (trouble); or *patria* (native home), supply by subaudition *terra* (land), or *Judea*, supply by subaudition *provincia* (province). Consult the *New Latin Method* for further discussion.[13]

I have said that adjectives have two significations, one distinct, which is that of the form, and the other confused, which is that of the subject. But it must not be concluded from this that they signify the form more directly than the subject, as if the more distinct signification were also the more direct. Because on the contrary, it is certain that they signify the subject directly, and as the grammarians say, *in recto*, although more confusedly, and that they only signify the form indirectly, what the grammarians call *in obliquo*, however more distinctly. Thus *white*, *candidus*, signifies directly that which has whiteness, *habens candorem*, but in a most confused manner, marking in particular no one thing which could have whiteness, and it signifies whiteness only indirectly, but in a manner as distinct as the word whiteness itself, *candor*.

adjectives: { form distinct but indirect / subject confused but direct

[12] Vergil, *Eclogues*, 3, 80.
[13] *New Latin Method*, Bk. VI, 87.

III

OF PROPER NOUNS AND APPELLATIVES OR GENERAL NOUNS

We have two sorts of ideas. First of all, the ones which represent only a single thing to us like the idea that each person has of his father and of his mother, of a friend, of his horse, of his dog, of himself, etc. 1

The other sort is that which represents to us several similar things, to which the idea is equally suitable, as the idea that I have of man in general, of horse in general, etc. 2

Men needed different names for these two different sorts of ideas.

They have called those which are suitable to singular ideas *proper nouns*, like the name *Socrates*, which refers to a certain philosopher; or the name *Paris* which refers to a certain city.

They have called those nouns which signify common ideas *general nouns* or *appellatives*, like the word *man* which refers to all men in general, and similarly the words *lion*, *dog*, *horse*, etc.

This is not to say that it does not often happen that proper names fit several individuals, such as *Pierre*, *Jean*, etc.; but this is only accidental, because several individuals have taken the same name. And then it is necessary to add other names to it which will make it determinate and which will make it once again serve as a proper noun, as the name Louis, which fits several individuals, becomes proper to the King who rules today by saying *Louis the Fourteenth*. Often it is not even necessary to add anything, because the context of discourse makes it sufficiently clear of whom one is speaking.

add proper nouns

X

EXAMINATION OF A RULE OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE; NAMELY THAT ONE OUGHT NOT PUT THE RELATIVE AFTER A NOUN WITHOUT AN ARTICLE

What has led me to undertake to examine this rule is that it gives me the opportunity to speak in passing of many things which are very important for the rationalization of language, but which would oblige me to take too much time if I wanted to treat them individually.

Mr. de Vaugelas is the first to have enunciated this rule, as well as several other very judicious ones, with which his remarks are filled, namely that after a noun without an article one must not put the *qui* (who, which).[1] Thus one says properly, *il a été traité avec violence* (he has been treated with violence), but if I wish to indicate that this violence has been thoroughly inhuman, I can do this only by adding an article: *il a été traité avec une violence qui a été tout-à-fait inhumaine* (he has been treated with a violence which was totally inhuman).

This appears at first very reasonable, until one becomes aware that there are several modes of speech in French which do not conform to this rule, as for example among others the following: *il agit en politique qui sait gouverner* (he acts like [a] politician who knows how to govern), *il est coupable de crimes qui méritent*

[1] Vaugelas, *Remarques*, "*L'article indefini ne reçoit jamais après soy le pronom relatif, ou, le pronom relatif ne se rapporte jamais au nom qui n'a que l'article indefini*", 385; "*Le pronom relatif ne peut se rapporter à un nom qui n'a point d'articles*", 387-389. Chomsky argues in *Language and Mind* that the so-called rule of Vaugelas, which involves the relation between indefinite articles and relative clauses in French "for a hundred and fifty years ... was the central issue debated in the controversy over the possibility of developing a 'rational grammar' ...", 13.

châtiment (he is guilty of crimes which deserve punishment), *il n'y a homme qui sache cela* (there is no man who knows that), *Seigneur, qui voyez ma misère, assistez-moi* (Lord, who sees my misery, help me), *une sorte de bois qui est fort dur* (a sort of wood which is very hard). In view of such examples I wondered whether this rule could not be put in such terms as to render it more general, and to make manifest that these modes of speech and other similar ones, which appear to be contrary to the rule, are not in fact contrary. Here therefore is the rule as I have conceived it:

In current French usage, a *qui* ought not be put after a common noun, if it is not determined by an article or by some other thing which determines it no less than an article would.

In order to fully understand this, it is necessary to recall that one can distinguish two things in the common noun: the signification, which is fixed (for if it sometimes varies, by equivocation or by metaphor, this is accidental), and the extension of this signification, which is subject to variation according to how the noun is interpreted, either as referring to a whole species, or to a distinct or an indistinct part.[2]

It is only with regard to this extension that we say that a common noun is *indeterminate* when there is nothing which indicates whether it ought to be taken generally or particularly; and being taken particularly, whether it stands for a distinct or indistinct

[2] This distinction, which parallels the modern distinction between meaning and reference, is more fully developed in the *Logic*, where it is referred to as the distinction between *comprehension* and *extension* and is explicated as follows:

> The comprehension of an idea is the constituent parts which make up the idea. For example, the idea of a triangle is made up of the idea of having three sides, the idea of having three angles, and the idea of having angles whose sum is equal to two right angles, and so on.
>
> The extension of an idea is the objects to which the word expressing the idea can be applied. The objects which belong to the extension of an idea are called the inferiors of that idea, which with respect to them is called the superior. Thus, the general idea of a triangle has in its extension triangles of all kinds whatsoever. (*Logic*, 51).

The passage in the *Logic* goes on to indicate that the extension may be applied to all of the inferiors or only to some without changing the meaning, (52).

particular. And, on the contrary, we say that a noun is *determined* when there is something which indicates its determination. This makes manifest that by *determined* we do not mean *restricted*, since according to what we have just said, a common noun ought to be considered determined when there is something which indicates that it ought to be taken in its full extension, as in the following proposition: *toute homme est raisonnable* (every man is rational).[3]

It is upon this that our rule is founded. For one can well make use of a common noun, while only considering its signification as in the example that I proposed, *il a été traité avec violence* (he was treated with violence), where it is not necessary that I determine it [i.e. the common noun]; but if one wishes to say something particular about it, one does this by adding a *qui* (which). It is very reasonable that in those languages which have articles for determining the extension of common nouns, one uses them then, so that one can better know to what this *qui* (which) ought to be related, whether it is to all which can be signified by the common noun, or only to a distinct or indistinct part.

But one also sees from all this that, as the article is necessary on these occasions only in order to determine the common noun, if it is determined in some other way, one can adjoin a *qui* to it as if there were an article. And this is what makes manifest the need for expressing this rule as we have done, in order to make it general. This also shows that almost all the modes of speech which seem contrary to this are in fact conformable to it, because the noun which is without an article is determined by some other thing. But when I say "by some other thing", I do not include in it the *qui* which is joined to the noun. For if one did include it,

[3] Note that in the *Grammar*, "determined" means either that the scope of the noun is restricted to some subset of the extension, or else that the noun is clearly referring to the entire class in its full extension. In the *Logic*, on the other hand, "determined" is used as a synonym for restricted. Thus in the *Logic*, it is asserted that when an addition made to a term "restricts the extension ... the addition is called a determination" (118). Or again, "a complex expression is a *determination* if the extension expressed by the complex term is less than the extension of the idea, expressed by the principal word" (60).

one could never act contrary to this rule, since one could always say that one only uses a *qui* after a noun without an article in a mode of speech determined by the *qui* itself.

Thus, in order to give an account of nearly every objection to this rule, one must merely consider the different ways in which a noun without an article can be determined.

(1) It is certain that proper nouns which only signify a single thing are determined by themselves, and that is why I have spoken of the rule in question only with regard to common nouns, it being indubitable that it is perfectly proper to say, *il imite Virgile, qui est le premier des poètes* (he imitates Virgil, who is the greatest of poets), *toute ma confiance est en Jésus-Christ, qui m'a racheté* (all my trust is in Jesus Christ, who has redeemed me).

(2) Nouns in the vocative are also determined by the very nature of the vocative case, so that an article is not required to adjoin a *qui* to such a noun since it is indeed the supression of the article which renders a noun vocative and which distinguishes it from the nominative. It is therefore not at all contrary to our rule to say: *Ciel, qui connaissez mes maux* (Heaven, who know my afflictions); *soleil, qui voyez toutes choses* (sun, who see all things).

(3) *Ce* (this), *quelque* (some), *plusieurs* (several), the names of the numbers, such as *two* and *three*, etc. *tout* (all), *nul* (none), *aucun* (any), etc. determine as much as do the articles. This is too obvious to dwell upon.

(4) In negative propositions, the terms on which the negation falls are determined to be taken generally by the negation itself, whose nature is to take everything away. This is the reason why one says affirmatively with the article: *il a de l'argent* (he has money), *du cœur* (courage), *de la charité* (charity), *de l'ambition* (ambition), and negatively without the article: *il n'a point d'argent* (he has no money), *de cœur* (courage), *de charité* (charity), *d'ambition* (ambition). And it is this which also shows that the following modes of speech are not contrary to our rule: *il n'y a point d'injustice qu'il ne commette* (there is no injustice which he does not commit); *il n'y a homme qui sache cela* (there is no man who knows that). Nor does even the following violate the rule: *est-il ville dans le*

royaume qui soit plus obéissante? (is there a city in the kingdom which is more obedient?), for an affirmative with an interrogative reduces in meaning to a negation: *il n'y a point de ville qui soit plus obéissante* (there is no city which is more obedient).

(5) It is an absolutely true rule of logic that in affirmative propositions, the subject draws the predicate to itself, that is, determines it. And this is the reason why the following argument is false: Man is an animal, a monkey is an animal; therefore a monkey is a man; i. e. since "animal" is the predicate of the first two propositions, the two different subjects determine two different sorts of animal.[4] This is why it is not at all contrary to our rule to say *je suis homme qui parle franchement* (I am a man who speaks frankly), for *homme* (man) is determined by *je* (I). This is indeed so true that the verb which follows the *qui* is better put in the first person than in the third. For example, *je suis homme qui ai bien vu des choses* (I am a man who have seen many things) rather than *qui a bien vu des choses* (who has seen many things).

(6) The words *sort*, *species*, *genus*, and similar words determine the ones that follow them, which, for this reason, ought not have an article. For example, we say *une sorte de fruit* (a sort of fruit) and not *d'un fruit* (of a fruit). This is why it is correct to say *une sorte de fruit qui est mûr en hiver* (a sort of fruit which ripens in winter); *une espèce de bois qui est fort dur* (a species of wood which is very hard).

(7) The particle *en* (literally, in) in the sense of the Latin *ut* as in *vivit ut rex*, *il vit en roi* (he lives like a [literally, in] king), includes in itself the article equivalent to *comme un roi* (like a king) or *en la manière d'un roi* (in the manner of a king). This is why it is not contrary to our rule to say: *il agit en roi qui sait régner* (he acts like a [in] king who knows how to rule), or *il parle en homme qui sait faire ses affaires* (he speaks like a [in] man who knows how to conduct his affairs). In the former example, *comme un roi* (like a king) is what is meant; in the latter *comme un homme* (like a man).

(8) *De* alone with a plural often takes the place of *des* which is

[4] Cf. *Logic*, 168-169.

the plural of the article *un* (a), as we have shown in the chapter dealing with the article. And thus the following modes of speech are very good and are not contrary to our rule: *Il est accablé de maux qui lui font perdre patience* (he is overwhelmed by troubles which make him lose patience); *il est chargé de dettes qui vont au-delà de son bien* (he is charged with debts which exceed his belongings).

(9) The following modes of speech, good or bad: *c'est grêle qui tombe* (it is hail which falls), *ce sont gens habiles qui m'ont dit cela* (it is able people who told me that), are not at all contrary to our rule, because the *qui* is not related to the noun which is without an article, but to the *ce* (it) which serves for all genders and numbers. For the noun without the article, *grêle* (hail), *gens habiles* (able people), is what I affirm and consequently the predicate and the *qui* make up part of the subject of which I affirm. For I affirm of *ce qui tombe* (it which falls) that *c'est de la grêle* (it is hail); of *ceux qui m'ont dit cela* (those who told me that) that *ce sont des gens habiles* (they are able people). And since the *qui* is not at all related to the noun without the article, it has nothing to do with our rule.

If there are other modes of speech which seem contrary to our rule, and which one can not rationalize by means of the preceding observations, these, I believe, can only be vestiges of an older style, where articles were almost always omitted. It is a maxim that those who work on a living language must always keep sight of the fact that those modes of speech which are authorized by a general and uncontested usage ought to pass as legitimate, even if they are contrary to the rules and internal analogy of the language.[5] On the other hand, one ought not adduce them in order to cast doubt upon the rules and disturb the analogy of languages, nor should they be used to authorize as consequences of themselves other modes of speech which usage has not authorized. Otherwise,

[5] Ferdinand de Saussure, in his *Course in General Linguistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), gives a succinct definition of analogy: "Analogy supposes a model and its regular imitation. An analogical form is a form made on the model of one or more other forms in accordance with a general rule" (161).

he who will linger only on these aberrations of usage, without observing the foregoing maxim, will cause a language to remain forever uncertain, and lacking any principles, it will never be able to be determined.

empirical method requires choices as to what is part of rules, and what is mode of speech!

XI

OF PREPOSITIONS[1]

We have said above in Chapter VI that cases and prepositions have been invented for the same purpose, namely, to indicate the relationship which things have with one another.

It is virtually the same relationships in all languages which are marked by prepositions; this is why I rest content with giving an account here of the principal ones of these which are marked by the prepositions of the French language, without obligating myself to give an exact examination of them, such as would be necessary in a particular grammar.[2]

I thus believe that the principal relationships can be reduced to the following:

[1] In the first edition of 1660, this chapter is numbered X, and this misnumbering continues until the end of the book.

[2] I.e. as opposed to a general grammar. Here French is being used ostensibly as an illustration of general principles.

of place, location, order	*dans* (in)	*Il est dans Paris.*	(He is in Paris.)
	en (in)	*Il est en Italie.*	(He is in Italy.)
	à (at)	*Il est à Rome.*	(He is at Rome.)
	hors (out)	*Cette maison est hors la ville.*	(This house is out of the city.)
	sur or *sus* (upon)	*Il est sur la mer.*	(He is upon the sea.)
	sous (under)	*Tout ce qui est sous le ciel.*	(All which is under heaven.)
	devant (before, in front of)	*Un tel marchait devant le roi.*	(Such a one walked before the king.)
	après (behind)	*Un tel marchait après le roi.*	(Such a one walked behind the king.)
	chez (at the place of)	*Il est chez le roi.*	(He is at the place of the king.)
of time	*avant* (before)	*Avant la guerre.*	(Before the war.)
	pendant (during)	*Pendant la guerre.*	(During the war.)
	depuis (since)	*Depuis la guerre.*	(Since the war.)
of the term indicating movement	where one is going	*en*	*Il va en Italie.* (to He goes to Italy.)
		à	*À Rome* (to to Rome.)
		vers	*L'aimant se tourne vers le nord.* (towards The magnet turns towards the north.)
		envers	*Son amour envers Dieu.* (towards His love towards God.)
	from where one leaves	*de*	*Il part de Paris.* (from He leaves from Paris.)

of cause	efficient	*par*	*Maison bâtie par un architecte.* (by House built by an architect.)
	material	*de*	*de pierre ou de brique.* (of of stone or of brick.)
	final	*pour*	*pour y loger.* (in order to in order to live there.)
other relationships of	union:	*avec*	*Les soldats avec leurs officiers.* (with The soldiers with their officers.)
	separation:	*sans*	*Les soldats sans leurs officiers.* (without The soldiers without their officers.)
	exception:	*outre*	*Compagnie de cent soldats outre les officiers.* (besides A company of a hundred soldiers besides officers.)
	opposition:	*contre*	*Soldats revoltés contre leurs officiers.* (against Soldiers revolted against their officers.)
	deletion:	*de*	*Soldats retranchés de regiment.* (from Soldiers excused from the regiment.)
	exchange:	*pour*	*Rendre un prisonnier pour un autre.* (for Give up a prisoner for another.)
	conformity:	*selon*	*Selon la raison.* (according to According to reason.)

There are some remarks to make concerning prepositions, as much for all languages as for French in particular.

First, on the subject of prepositions, no language has followed what reason would have desired, which is that one relationship

XIII

OF VERBS, AND OF THAT WHICH IS PROPER AND ESSENTIAL TO THEM[1]

Until now, we have explicated those words which signify the *objects* of thought.[2] It remains to speak of those which signify the *manner* of thought, i.e. the verbs, the conjunctions, and the interjections.

The knowledge of the nature of the verb depends on what we have said at the beginning of this discourse, namely that the judgments that we make about things, as when I say *the earth is round* necessarily includes two terms, one called the subject, which is that of which one affirms, *the earth* in the above example, and the other the predicate, which is that which is affirmed, *round* in the above example. There is further the connection between these two terms, which is properly speaking the action of our minds which affirms the predicate of the subject.

Thus men have had no less need of inventing words that mark *affirmation* or *assertion*, which is the principal mode of our thought, than of inventing words which mark the objects of our thought.

And this is properly speaking what the verb is, *a word whose principal use is to signify affirmation or assertion*, that is, to indicate that the discourse where this word is employed is the discourse of a man who not only conceives things, but who judges and affirms them. In this the verb is distinguished from a number of nouns which also signify affirmation, such as *affirmans* (an affirming), *affirmatio* (affirmation), because the latter signify it only in as much as by an act of reflection of the mind, the affirmation has

[1] *Logic*, Part II, Chapter 2, "The Verb" reprints the chapter virtually verbatim.
[2] See above, Part II, Chapter I ff.

become an object of our thought, and they do not indicate that he who makes use of these words *affirms*, but only that he conceives of an affirmation.

I have said that the principal use of the verb is to signify affirmation or assertion, because we will show later that it is also used in order to signify other movements of the soul, like *to desire*, *to pray*, *to command*, etc. But this is only changing the inflection and the mood, and thus we are considering the verb in this whole chapter only according to its principal signification, which is the one which it has in the indicative, and we shall withhold discussion of the others for another place.

According to that, one can say that the verb in itself ought to have no other use save to mark the connection that we make in our minds between the two terms of a proposition, but it is only the verb *to be*, which is called the substantive verb, which remained in this simple state, and further one can say that even this verb properly speaking only remained so in the third person present, *is*, and on certain occasions. For, as men naturally proceed to shorten their expressions, they have almost always joined to the affirmation some other significations in the same word.

(1) They have joined to it that of some attribute, so that in such a case the two words constitute a proposition, as when I say *Petrus vivit* (Peter lives). For the word *lives* includes not only the affirmation, but also the property of being alive. Thus it is the same thing to say *Peter lives* as to say *Peter is living*. From this comes the great diversity of verbs in each language. Whereas if people had been content to give to the verb the general signification of affirmation, without joining to it any particular attribute, one would only have had a need for one single verb in each language, which is the one called substantive.[3]

(2) They have also joined to it in certain instances the subject

[3] Cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, Chap. 12, 21b, 5, trans. E. M. Edghill, in Richard McKeon ed., *Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941). Cf. *Metaphysics*, 1017a, 28, trans. W. D. Ross, in McKeon, *Basic Works*, "For there is no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man recovers', nor between 'the man is walking' or 'cutting' and 'the man walks' or 'cuts', and similarly in all other cases."

of the proposition, so that in such an instance two words, and indeed even one word, can constitute a complete proposition. The case of two words is exemplified when one says in Latin *sum homo* (I am a man), because *sum* not only signifies the affirmation, but also includes the signification of the pronoun *ego* (I), which is the subject of this proposition, which in French is always expressed as *je suis homme* [or in English as *I am a man*]. A single word constituting a proposition is illustrated by the Latin examples *vivo* (I am living) and *sedeo* (I am sitting). For these verbs contain in themselves both the affirmation and the attribute, as we have already said, and being in the first person, they also include the subject, *I*. From this has arisen the difference of persons, which is ordinarily found in all verbs.

(3) They have also joined to it a relationship to the time regarding which the affirmation is made, so that a single word, like *caenasti* (you supped) signifies that I affirm of him to whom I am speaking the action of *supping*, not for the present time, but for the past. And from this has come the diversity of tenses which is again, ordinarily, common to all verbs.

The diversity of these significations joined in the same word is that which prevented many otherwise very astute people from properly understanding the nature of the verb, because they did not consider it according to what is essential to it, namely affirmation, but rather according to the following relationships which are accidental to it *qua* verb.

Thus Aristotle, having confined his attention to the third type of signification which is adjoined to that which is essential to the verb, defined it as *vox significans cum tempore* (a word which signifies with time).[4]

Others, like Buxtorf, having added the second signification, have defined it as follows: *vox flexilis cum tempore et persona*[5]

[4] Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, Chap. 3, 16b, 6; "A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time".

[5] Johannes Buxtorf (1564-1629) was Professor of Hebrew at Basle, and a well-known grammarian. He is best known for his grammar of the Hebrew language, *Epistome Grammaticae Hebraeae*. Brekle cites the reference to the London edition of 1653 as follows: Chapter XII, *De Verbo*, 22. Donzé, 188, n. 16, points out that similar definitions exist in the works of two other grammarians known to Arnauld and Lancelot: the *Gramere* of Ramus, and Sanctius' *Minerva*.

(a word which has different inflections with time [tenses] and persons).

Still others, having stopped at the first of these adjoined significations, namely that of the attribute, and having considered that the attributes that men have joined to the affirmation in the same word ordinarily pertain to actions and passions, believed that the essence of the verb consisted in *signifying actions or passions*.

And finally Julius Caesar Scaliger believed that he solved a great mystery in his book *On the Principles of the Latin Language* by saying that the distinction of things into *in permanentes et fluentes*, that which endures and that which changes, was the true source of the distinction between nouns and verbs; the nouns signifying what endures, and the verbs signifying what changes.[6]

But it is easy to see that all these definitions are false, and do not at all explain the true nature of the verb.

The manner in which the first two definitions were conceived makes this manifest, because it is not at all said there what the verb signifies, but only *with what* it signifies — *cum tempore, cum persona*, with time [tense], with person.

The latter two are even worse, for they suffer from the two greatest vices of a definition, *neque omni, neque soli*, which is to fit neither all that is being defined, nor only what is being defined.

For there are verbs which signify neither actions nor passions, nor what changes, like *existit* (it exists), *quiescit* (it rests), *friget* (it is cold), *alget* (it is chilled), *tepet* (it is warm), *calet* (it is hot), *albet* (it is white), *viret* (it is green), *claret* (it is bright), of which we will speak in another place.

And furthermore there are some words that are not verbs at all which signify actions and passions and even things which change in conformity with Scaliger's definition. For it is certain that

[6] Scaliger, 134, 137, 220. In the *New Latin Method*, Book VI, 98, Lancelot cites Sanctius as holding this same view. Cf. Sanctius, Book III, Chapter II, text cited in Donzé, 209, n. 57.

participles are truly nouns, and that nonetheless those which are formed from active verbs signify actions and those which are formed from passive verbs signify passions, no less than the very verbs from whence they come, and there is no reason whatever to pretend that *fluens* (flowing) does not signify something which comes to pass as much as does *fluit* (it flows).

To which one can add, against the first two definitions of a verb, that participles also signify with time [tense], since there are present participles, past participles, and future participles, especially in Greek. And those who believe, not without reason, that a vocative is actually a second person, especially when it has a different ending from the nominative, will find that there is in this regard only a quantitative [rather than qualitative] difference between the participle and the verb.

And thus the essential reason why a participle is not a verb is that it does not at all signify *affirmation* or assertion, from whence it comes that it can form a proposition (this being the property of the verb) only by adding a verb, that is by replacing what has been removed in changing the verb into a participle. For why is it that *Petrus vivit* (Peter lives) is a proposition while *Petrus vivens* (Peter living) is not, if not because the affirmation which is contained in *vivit* (lives) has been removed in order to form the participle *vivens* (living). From whence it appears that the affirmation which is either found or not found in a word is what determines its being a verb or not a verb.

Concerning this one can further remark in passing that the infinitive, which is very often a noun (as we shall explain), as when we say *le boire* (the drink), *le manger* (food; literally, the eat), differs from participles in that participles are adjectival nouns, while the infinitive is a substantive noun, made by abstraction from this adjective, in the same way as from *candidus* in Latin comes *candor*, or from *white* comes *whiteness*. Thus in Latin *rubet*, a verb, signifies *is red*, comprising both the affirmation and the attribute, while *rubens*, the participle, simply signifies *red*, without the affirmation, and *rubere*, taken as a noun, signifies *redness*.

It ought therefore remain certain, in considering simply

what is essential to the verb, that its only true definition is *vox significans affirmationem* or a word which signifies affirmation or assertion. For one cannot find a word which marks affirmation – and which is not a verb, nor can one find a verb which does not serve to mark affirmation, at least in the indicative. And it is indubitable that if a word such as *est* (is), which always marked affirmation, had been invented without having any difference either of person or tense, so that the diversity of persons were marked solely by nouns and pronouns, and the diversity of tenses by adverbs, it would not fail to be a true verb. Thus, in fact, in the propositions that the philosophers call eternal like *God is infinite*, *all body is divisible*, *the whole is greater than its parts*, the word *is* signifies only simple affirmation, without any relationship to time, because these are true for all time, and without our mind attending to any diversity of persons.[7]

Thus the verb, according to its essential characterization, is a word which signifies affirmation. But if one wished to add to the definition of the verb its principal accidental qualities noted earlier, it could be defined as follows: *vox significans affirmationem, cum designatione personae, numeri et temporis* (a word which signifies affirmation or assertion, with the designation of person, number, and time [tense]). This is what properly belongs to substantive verbs.

As far as the other verbs are concerned, in so far as they differ from it in terms of the union which men have made of the affirmation with certain attributes, they can be defined in this way: *vox significans affirmationem alicujus attributi, cum designatione personae, numeri, et temporis* (a word which marks the affirmation or assertion of some attribute, with the designation of person, number, and time [tense]).

And it can be noted in passing that the affirmation, in so far as it is conceived, can also be the attribute of the verb. For example, in the verb *affirmo* (affirm), this verb signifies two affirmations; of which one concerns the person who is speaking and the other

[7] What is being distinguished here are what Kant later called "analytic *a priori* judgments", and what Hume called "relations of ideas".

concerns the person of whom one speaks, whether the latter is the speaker or another person. For when I say *Petrus affirmat* (Peter affirms), *affirmat* is the same thing as *est affirmans* (is affirming), and therefore *est* (is) marks my affirmation, or the judgment that I make concerning Peter, and *affirmans* ([is] affirming) marks the affirmation that I conceive and that I attribute to Peter.

The verb *nego* (deny), on the contrary, contains an affirmation and a negation, for the same reason.

It is necessary once again to remark that although not all our judgments are affirmations, there being some negative ones, nevertheless the verbs themselves do not signify anything but affirmations, the negations being marked by the particles *non*, *ne*, or by nouns that entail these particles: *nullus* (none, not any), or *nemo* (no one), which, when joined to verbs, change the affirmation into a negation, for example, *nul homme n'est immortel* (no man is immortal); *nullum corpus est indivisibile* (no body is indivisible).

But after having explained the essence of the verb, and having in a few words indicated its principal accidents, it is necessary to consider these same accidents in a bit more detail, and it is appropriate to begin with those which are common to all verbs, to wit, the diversity of persons, numbers, and tenses.

XIV

OF THE DIVERSITY OF PERSONS AND NUMBERS IN VERBS

We have already stated that the diversity of persons and numbers in verbs has come from the fact that men have wanted, for the sake of brevity, to join in the same word to the affirmation which is proper to the verb, the subject of the proposition, at least in certain instances. For when a man speaks of himself, the subject of the proposition is the first person pronoun, *ego* (I); and when he speaks of him to whom he addresses his speech, the subject of the proposition is the second person pronoun, *thou*, *you*.

Now, to obviate always having to make use of these pronouns, it was believed that it would suffice to give to the word which signifies the affirmation a certain ending which indicated that it is of oneself that one is speaking, and it is this which has been called the first person form of the verb, as in *video* (I see).

The same thing has been done with regard to the one to whom speech is addressed, and this is what has been called the second person, *vides* (thou seest). And as these pronouns have their plural form, when one speaks of oneself together with others, *nos* (we), or of the one to whom one speaks also together with others, *vos* (you), two different endings have been given to the plural: *videmus* (we see), *videtis* (you see).

But because the subject of the proposition is often neither the speaker nor the one to whom one is speaking, it was necessary in order to restrict these two endings to these two sorts of person, to create a third ending that was joined to all the other subjects of the proposition. And this is what has been called the third person, both in the singular and in the plural, although the word *person*

XXIV

OF SYNTAX, OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS PUT TOGETHER

There remains to be said a word about syntax, or the construction of words put together, about which it will not be difficult to give some general notions according to the principles we have established.

Syntax is generally distinguished into two parts: agreement, when words ought to agree with one another, and government, when one of two words causes a variation in the other.

The first, for the most part, is the same in all languages, because it is a natural result of what is in use nearly everywhere to better distinguish discourse.

Thus the distinction of two numbers, singular and plural, has necessitated making the substantive agree with the adjective in number, that is to say, putting one of the words in the singular or plural when the other is. For since the substantive is the subject which is indicated confusedly, albeit directly, by the adjective, then if the substantive word marks several things, there are several subjects which share the characteristic marked by the adjective, and consequently the adjective must be in the plural: *homines docti*, *hommes doctes* (learned men).

The distinction of feminine and masculine has similarly necessitated putting substantives and adjectives into the same gender, or else putting both into the neuter in those languages which have a neuter; for it was indeed only for this purpose that genders were invented.

Verbs, similarly, ought to agree in number and person with nouns and pronouns. If one encounters something apparently

contrary to these rules, it is by a figure of speech, that is to say, by some word being understood, or else by considering the thoughts [that the words stand for] rather than the words themselves, as we shall see later.

The syntax of government, on the contrary, is almost totally arbitrary, and for this reason is very different in all languages. Some languages effect governing according to case; the others make use only of small particles which take the place of cases and which only indicate a few of these cases, as French and Spanish only have *of* and *to* to indicate the genitive and the dative respectively, while Italian adjoins *da* for the ablative. The other cases do not have any particles, but rather the simple article, which is not even always found.

For more on this subject, what has been said earlier in this treatise concerning prepositions and cases should be consulted.

But it is well to note some general maxims which are of major use in all languages.[1]

The first is that there is never a nominative which lacks a relationship to some verb either expressed or understood, because the purpose of speech is not only to indicate conception, but also to express what is thought about what is conceived, and this latter purpose is what is marked by the verb.

The second is that there is also no verb which lacks its nominative, either expressed or understood, because the nature of the verb being affirmation or assertion, it is necessary that there be something of which one affirms, this being the subject of the nominative of the verb, although before infinitives it is in the accusative: *scio Petrum esse doctum* (I know Peter [him] to be learned).

[1] These rules are basically derived from the *New Latin Method*, where Lancelot discusses a series of general maxims, including the first four discussed in this chapter of the *Grammar*. In the *Grammar*, however, these rules are discussed in the part of the chapter dealing with regular syntax, while in the *New Latin Method* they are dealt with in the section on figurative syntax, in the chapter on ellipsis. See Book VII, "Of Figurative Syntax", Chapter I, "Of the first figure called Ellipsis", 166ff. Lancelot cites Sanctius as the source of his discussion (167).

The third is that there can be no adjective which is not related to a substantive, because the adjective confusedly indicates a substantive, namely the subject of the characteristic which is marked distinctly by this adjective: *doctus* (learned) is related to someone who is learned.[2]

The fourth is that there is never a genitive in discourse which is not governed by another noun. For since this case always marks something like the possessor, it is necessary that it be governed by the thing possessed. This is why no verb properly governs the genitive, either in Greek or in Latin, as is made clear in the *New Methods* for these languages.[3] This rule can be applied to the vernacular languages with greater difficulty, because the particle *de*, which is the mark of the genitive, is often put for the preposition *de*, i. e. *ex* (out of).

The fifth maxim is that the case which a verb is to govern is often chosen according to the caprice of custom from among the various sorts of relationships which are inherent in the cases, which choice does not change the relationship which is specific to each case, but rather demonstrates that custom has been able to choose this or that case as it pleases.

Thus some say in Latin *juvare aliquem* (to aid someone; accusative), and some say *opitulari alicui* (to aid someone; dative), although these are two verbs for *to aid*, because the Latins chose to regard the word which the former verb governs as the term where the action takes place, and the word which the latter governs as an instance of attribution, to which the action of the verb was related.

Thus in French one says *servir quelqu'un* (to serve someone), and *servir à quelque chose* (to serve for something).

Thus in Spanish, the majority of active verbs governs the dative or the accusative indifferently.

Thus the same verb can govern different cases, especially when one admixes cases governed by prepositions, like *praestare alicui* or *aliquem* (to surpass someone; dative or accusative).

[2] See above, Part II, Chapter II, last paragraph.

[3] See *New Latin Method*, Book V, Rule X, 21ff; Book VII, Maxim VII, 172-173; *New Greek Method*, Book VII, Rule IX, 351ff., especially 354.

Thus one says, for example, *eripere morti aliquem* (to snatch someone [accusative] from death [dative]) or *mortem alicui* (death [accusative] from someone [dative]) or *aliquem ā morte* (someone [accusative] from death [ablative]), and so forth.

Sometimes these different ways of governing have themselves the force of changing the meaning of the expression, according to the authorization of custom, since, for example, in Latin *cavere alicui* [dative] is *to look out for someone's interest*, but *cavere aliquem* [accusative] is *to beware of someone*. In this it is always necessary to consult the custom of the language in question.

Of the figures of construction[4]

What we have said earlier about syntax is sufficient to allow the understanding of its natural order, when all the parts of discourse are simply expressed, and where there are no extra words and no missing words, and where the discourse is in conformity with the natural expression of our thoughts.

But because men often follow the meaning of their thoughts rather than the words which are used to express them, and because often, in order to abbreviate, they omit something from discourse, or even because, considering elegance of style, they allow some word which seems superfluous, or they reverse the natural order of words — for all these reasons it has come about that four modes of speaking called *figurative* were introduced, which are like so many irregularities in grammar, although they are sometimes perfections and beautifications of language.

The mode which agrees more with our thoughts than with the words of discourse is called *syllepsis* or conception, as when

[4] As previously indicated, this discussion of the figures is derived from Sanctius. The account of figurative syntax is much more detailed in the *New Latin Method*, where an entire book is devoted to it (Book VII). Lakoff, "Review", *Language* 45, 352ff., argues that the discussion of ellipsis in the *New Latin Method* is the best evidence of transformational elements in the Port-Royal grammatical corpus. Lakoff further argues that since this notion is primarily derived from Sanctius, the Port-Royal grammarians are more Sanctian than Cartesian, contrary to Chomsky's claim.

I say *il est six heures* (it is six o'clock; literally, it is six hours) for, according to the words, it would be necessary to say *elles sont six heures* (they are six hours), as was indeed said formerly, and as one still says *ils sont six, huit, dix, quinze, hommes* (they are six, eight, ten, fifteen, men), etc. But, because we purport to indicate a precise time, and only one of these hours, namely the sixth, my thought, which is directed to this sixth hour without considering the actual words, causes me to say *il est six heures*, rather than *elles sont six heures*.

And this figure sometimes creates irregularities of gender, like *ubi est scelus qui me perdidit*? (where is the crime [neuter] which [literally, who, masculine] destroyed me?), of number, like *turba ruunt*[5] (the crowd rushes [literally, rush] along), and of both together like *pars mersi tenuere ratem* (some [literally, a part, feminine singular], though submerged [masculine plural], hung onto the ship), etc.

That which excises something from discourse is called *ellipsis* or omission. For example, sometimes the verb is understood, which is quite common in Hebrew, where the substantive verb is almost always understood. Sometimes the nominative is understood, as in *pluit* (it rains) for *Deus* or *natura pluit* (God or nature rains). Sometimes the substantive is understood while the adjective is expressed, for example, in *paucis te volo* where *verbis alloqui* is understood (I wish [to address] a few [words] to you). Sometimes the word which governs another word is understood, like *est Romae* (he is at Rome) instead of *est in urbe Romae* (he is in the city of Rome).[6] And finally, something which is governed is understood, as in the case of *facilius reperias* (*homines* is understood) *qui Romam proficiscantur quam qui Athenas* (Cicero) (you would more easily find [men] to go to Rome than [men] to go to Athens).

The mode of speaking which has more words than are required

[5] Ovid, *Heroides*, 1.88; 12.43.

[6] This example is incorrect, as the word *Romae* in the sentence *est Romae* is not genitive, as Arnauld and Lancelot assume, but locative.

is called *pleonasm* or abundance, like *vivere vitam* (to live a life), *magis major* (more greater), etc.

And that mode of speaking which reverses the natural order of discourse is called *hyperbaton* or reversal.

One can see examples of all these figures in the grammars of particular languages, and especially in the *New Methods* for Greek and Latin, where this is amply discussed.[7]

I add only that there is scarcely a language which uses fewer of these figures than French, because it is particularly fond of clarity and of expressing things as much as possible in the most natural and least encumbered fashion, although at the same time, French is second to none in either beauty or elegance.[8]

ADVERTISEMENT[9]

We have not spoken at all in this grammar of derived or compound words, about which there would be many interesting things to say, because this concerns the task of a general dictionary rather than a general grammar. But it is a pleasure to report that since the first printing of this book, another has appeared entitled *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, which being based on the same principles, is very useful for clarifying this book, and for proving several things which are treated here.

[7] *New Latin Method*, Book VII, Chapter VII, "Observations on figurative construction", 367ff.

[8] It is ironically fitting that this alleged "general grammar" should end with so blatantly ethnocentric a pronouncement.

[9] This advertisement does not appear in the first edition of 1660, since the first edition of the Logic appeared in 1662.