notes for lang&cog essay

http://www.uoregon.edu/~uophil/metaphor/neurophl.htm

traditional theory states that metaphor/figurative meaning is a bag of tricks
to extend literal meaning. eg. Searle (1979)
figurative interpretation is cued when literal interpretation fails.
but: processing time is often not longer with metaphors. processing is probably
parallel, or unitary. (see Gibbs 1994, pp. 92-108 for a useful overview)

the opposite could also be true: meaning is initially metaphorical, literal
interpretation is forced.

perhaps both hemispheres necessary for metaphor comprehension: breakdown of bicameral mind --> increased co-ordinnation between hemispheres.


basic feature of literate language use: fiction. thus, much of our metaphors/
concepts can be useful fiction, eg. the self, prop. attitutudes etc.

language evolves to be useful, practical, parsimonous -- not faithfulness
to reality. NB: language seems to lack power to describe the intermediate stages of attaining personhood -- what happens is anthropomorphizing: 'mindlessly' ascribing categories to infants/earlier humans without being able to conceive of
different stages (intentional stance)

cave art: traditional interpretation sees this as proof that prehistoric mind
was same as modern mind.

consciousness has to have originated *sometime*, the mystical belief that it
has always been there is naturalisticly untenable. no reason why consciousness
should have evolved before humans evolved.

breakdown of bicameralism:
1: growing civilization = complexity
2: neurological basis: bilateral symmetry
3: vestiges: schzophrenia etc.

consciousness according to Jaynes:
1: mind space (time as dimension, introspection)
2: analog "I", self concept

"I hope it is obvious that P-consciousness is not a cultural construction.
(...) The idea would be that there was a time at which people genetically like
us ate, drank, and had sex, but there was nothing it was like for them to do
these things. Further, each of us would have been like that if not for specific
concepts we acquired from our culture in growing up. Ridiculous!" (...)

"What about A-consciousness? Could there have been a time when humans who
are biologically the same as us never had the contents of their perceptions
and thoughts poised for free use in reasoning or in rational control of action?
Is this ability one that culture imparts to us as children? Could it be that
until we acquired the concept of `poised for free use in reasoning or in
rational control of action', none of our perceptual contents were A-conscious?
Again, there is no reason to take such an idea seriously. Very much lower
animals are A-conscious, presumably without any such concept" (Block, 1995, p.
238, my italics). quoted in Sleutels (20xx)

NB: note lack of any argument, purely appeal to intuition. cf. Searle against
AI. critique against arm-chair philosophy applies here. consciousness is taken
for granted as "natural kind"!

consciousness: "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" -- yet we have
no reason to chase white ravens.

bicameralism rests on assumption that concepts can be had without consciousness
seems more like a set of "habits", instead of what we commonly understand as
concepts.

history of personal pronouns? was greek "ego" late invention?

importance of historical dimension:
"If consciousness is real now, then it has always been real, while if it is not, then it never was." (Sleutel, 20xx)