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%mention something about the word mind which sounds more natural than
% germanic 'geist', which properly indicates the illusory nature, ghost in the machine etc.

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{\Large {\bf Language, consciousness and the bicameral mind} }

{Andreas van Cranenburgh\footnote{\texttt{andreas@unstable.nl}}, \today} \\
{\em Final essay, Language \& Cognition course, University of Amsterdam}
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%\abstract{ }
\tableofcontents

The controversial thesis of the bicameral mind (Jaynes 1976) seems not to get
the attention it deserves. Even though it is a social constructivist view
on consciousness, at the same time the thesis presents a strictly physicalist
approach to the mind. Consciousness is not `just' a social construction
(whatever that would mean), it is a social construction with very tangible
consequences. I will compare his views on consciousness to others and rebut
some all-too-easy criticisms.

The basic problem of implausibility with this hypothesis is whether to assume
people's minds in ancient times were exactly like ours, or whether they could
have been radically different and that this difference can be inferred from
archeological evidence and ancient texts. The idea that the human mind has
always been the same is a surprisingly common one, at least as a somewhat
implicit assumption. To me this view, on its face value, is just as implausible
as the one under discussion here. 

\section{Consciousness from language}

\subsection{What consciousness is {\em not}}
There is much confusion about what consciousness is. It appears that the most
frequent reason for dismissing Jaynes's theories is because of a disregard of
his definition of consciousness. The misconceptions about consciousness that
Jaynes describes are as follows:

\begin{description}
\item[Consciousness not a copy of experience]
Since Locke's tabula rasa it has been thought that consciousness records our
experiences, to save them for possible later reflection. However, this is
clearly false: most details of our experience are immediately lost when not
given special notice. Recalling an arbitrary past event requires a
reconstruction of memories. Interestingly, memories are often from a
third-person perspective, which proves that they could not be a mere copy of
experience.

\item[Consciousness not necessary for concepts]
That concepts are rule-based reflections of either reason or `sense data' has
long been the received view. Basic-level categories and prototypes have
supplanted this view, however. Jaynes defines concepts as `behaviorally
equivalent things' -- ie., purely extensional. While this sounds awfully
limited, it is precisely the way basic-level categories are studied with
children, using preferential looking methods (Mareschal 2002).

\item[Consciousness not necessary for learning]
Surely some forms of learning occur consciously, but in fact many forms of
learning happen automatically and are impeded by conscious monitoring.
Examples are conditioning and learning skills. Experiments show that people
can be influenced by cues, as long as this happens without their awareness.
When learning is construed in purely physicalist terms as plasticity, it
becomes obvious that consciousness should not be a necessary condition.
Learning does often require attention and concentration, but these are
different from consciousness. 

\item[Consciousness not necessary for thinking]
Thinking in the sense of judgment and free association is an unconscious
process. This was demonstrated in a word association experiment (Watt, 1905)
where subjects were instructed to produce associations with certain
constraints. It turned out that of the four stages, instruction, stimulus,
search and reply, the search for the word was introspectively blank. The
preparatory part, called struction by Jaynes (connoting both {\em instruction}
and {\em construction}), is accessible to consciousness, and the end result
of generating appropriate replies -- but not the search itself, which is an
automatic process. This is of course the very reason that introspectionism
failed to take off.

\item[Consciousness not necessary for reason]
As a remnant of faculty psychology, reason is often conceived as part of
consciousness. The kind of abduction so prevalent in daily life often presents
us with unjustifiable yet succesful conclusions. The mathematical kind of
rigorous reasoning is too slow to be of any help in situations that require
immediate decisions. And even the highest intellectual pursuit, science,
crucially hinges on intuition in the form of hypothesis making. Eureka moments
occurred to Archimides in his bath, to Poincar/'e while stepping in a bus.

\item[Consciousness `not in the head']
The Cartesian Theater, experienced to be somewhere behind our eyes, is a
pervasive illusion. In fact, as demonstrated by the writings of Aristotle and
expressions such as ``follow your heart,'' it is rather arbitrary: it has also
been experienced as located in the chest. Although it is useful as a reference
point to locate consciousness somewhere in the body, the fact of the matter is
that it has no real location whatsoever.

\item[Consciousness is not self-recognition]
Proponents of animal consciousness usually support their case with the results
of experiments with primates who come to recognize a dot on their forehead or
ears with the help of a mirror. The idea that this is evidence for
consciousness is quite absurd, because, as Jaynes argues, it is little
different from recognizing a dot on your knee.
\end{description}

So it is clear that large parts of cognition do not require consciousness.
Indeed, the account of Tomasello et al. (2005) of the origins of cultural
cognition is completely independent from consciousness, instead mentioning such
things as shared intentionality and intention reading. In this picture, the
development of language is possible without consciousness, and it is
conceivable that consciousness is a later development, both phylogenetically
and ontogenetically. %Social intelligence hypothesis.


 \subsection{What consciousness is}
After having demolished so many preconceptions of consciousness, it might seem
tempting to do away with consciousness altogether, like the bevaviorists did
(although only in a methodological sense, it can be argued). Not so.
Consciousness has had a profound effect on human history. The most imporant
features of consciousness according to Jaynes are:

\begin{description}
\item[Mind space] The experienced space where memories are recalled, imagery is
`perceived' and actions can be simulated before performing them. Mind space
gives rise to such things as perceiving time as a dimension and introspection.

\item[analog ``I''] In order to experience this mind space, there has to be an
`observer' (or `actor,' depending on the context). The analog ``I'' is
abstracted from the real world. 

\item[Narratization] ``Consciousness is ever ready to explain anything we
happen to find ourselves doing'' (Jaynes 1976). Anything we experience is
seamlessly woven into a narrative, making sense of it through a kind of
Peircean abduction.

\end{description}

This description and Jaynes's account of the role of metaphors can be seen as
a precursor to Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) metaphor theory. Thinking is
essentially `metaphorizing.' `Introspection,' for example, literally means
`looking in' the mind. In this way all our mental terms are based on metaphors
of concrete actions and situations.

The beauty of viewing consciousness as narratization is that instead of
anachronistically conflating it with the latest technological metaphor
(theater, movie screen, computer), it is associated with the very first
metaphor available: story telling. Before consciousness there were only myths,
fanciful explanations which were actually believed. Through consciousness it
becomes possible to imagine situations in mind space and appreciate fiction in
a possibly bracketed context, as well as moving along the temporal dimension
through random access to episodic memory.

 %But cf. Churchland (2005): visuo-centric and sensory-motor-centric perspective should be replaced with attention to temporal aspect of consciousness

% important: mention confabulation:
% http://books.google.ie/books?id=_rkKxbevFZEC&dq=brain+fiction+confabulation&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=9gVX7xFiMo&sig=ecS9mLduiZePctwU8lly9DejYjo&hl=en&ei=jvq2SYigB9nHjAefq62dCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPP11,M1

\subsection{The Bicameral mind}

\begin{quote}
``At one time, human nature was split in two, an executive part called a god,
and a follower part called a man. Neither part was Consciously aware.''
(Jaynes, 1976)
\end{quote}

Before devoloping consciousness humans had a bicameral mind, a division of two
chambers: a man part operating by habit, and a god part occasionally
intervening. These interventions were experienced as divine voices (such as
from dead leaders and kings, and later, as religion developed, of gods) in
cases of stress and unfamiliar situations. Evidence for this is claimed to be
in classical texts such as the Iliad and the Old Testament, which contain no
introspection, initiative or conscious reasoning, but only divine
interventions, prophets in `direct contact' with God and deities speaking in
dreams. Rather than being merely a literary or poetic device, this is to be
taken literally as a significant feature of ancient psychology. The dilemma is
that we either have to accept this `preposterous hypothesis' (Jaynes's own
words), or we have to explain, one way or another, why descriptions of
hearing voices are so common in ancient literature, and introspection absent.
Where introspection is seemingly present it has been added in later versions,
or imposed by modern translations.

Two texts from the Old Testament form a good demonstration. The first is Amos,
from the eight century B.C.\ and considered to be the oldest pure text (ie.,
not a compilation):

\begin{quote}
3 Thus saith the Lord; For three transgressions of Damascus, and for four, I
will not turn away {\em the punishment} thereof; because they have threshed
Gilead with threshing instruments of iron;

4 But I will send a fire into the house of Hazael, which shall devour the
palaces of Ben-hadad.

5 I will break also the bar of Damascus and cut off the inhabitant from the
plain of Aven, and him that holdeth the sceptre from the house of Eden: and the
people of Syria shall go into captivity unto Kir, saith the Lord.\\
 -- (Amos ch.\ 1, 3-5)
\end{quote}

Here we witness the familiar angry, vengeful Old Testament God. It is mostly God himself speaking. Amos, an illiterate desert herdsman, is not contemplating
life but merely reporting all that he has heard from God, to a scribe because
he is illiterate himself.

The second text is Ecclesiastes, from the second century B.C.\ and considered
to be the most recent text from the Old Testament:

\begin{quote}
14 I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and, behold, all i
{\em is} vanity and vexation of spirit.

15. {\em That which is} crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is
wanting cannot be numbered.

16. I communed with mine own heart, saying, Lo, I am come to great estate, and
have gotten more wisdom than all {\em they} that have been before me in
Jerusalem: yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge.

17. And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I
perceived that this also is vexation of spirit.

18. For in much wisdom {\em is} much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge
increaseth sorrow.\\
 -- (Ecclesiastes ch.\ 1, 14-18)
\end{quote}

Here is an account of life filled with introspection and metaphors, and not
the voice of God but that of Ecclesiastes himself.

These extremes in the Old Testament, angry speeches versus insightful
narratives, are well accounted for by the theory of the bicameral mind.

At first it might seem inconceivable that civilization could have existed
without consciousness. But consider ant colonies and beehives, which display
very complex and hierarchical behavior, all without the slightest hint of
consciousness. For an autonomous group of relatively fixed size this works very
well. Because human cities grew larger and through contact with other
civilizations, the bicameral mind broke down and consciousness emerged.

\section{Criticism}
\subsection{Generative and descriptive metaphors}
Jones (1982) presents a criticism of the bicameral mind in the form of `a case
study in the sociology of belief.' He concludes that three `cosmological
orientations' are responsible for the persuasiveness of the bicameral mind
among its proponents:

\begin{enumerate}
\item `a bias against gradualism and for discontinuity'
\item `a bias against narratization and spatialization' [in describing the mind]
\item `a desire for a sweeping, all-inclusive formula that explains everything
[...]'
\end{enumerate}

I can find nothing wrong with the listed biases, such that the critique of
Jones seems to be mostly one of hostility. For each of the three biases there
is an appropriate rebuttal. Ad 1, it rather seems that Jaynes is in
favor of genetic continuity, and prefers to view the discontinuities in
question as sociocultural developments (which ironically makes Jaynes somewhat
of an adherent to the continuity hypothesis of behavioral modernity). The
cultural evolution could well be of the Baldwinian sort: a controversial but
enduring theory stating that an aquired character or trait gradually becomes
assimilated in the epigenetic or genetic reportoire of an organism. Especially
learning as an adaptation is said to be bolstered by the Baldwin (1896) effect. Ad 2,
that narratization and spatialization are not always faithful to reality is
generally accepted, Jones's point seems to be an accusation that Jaynes views
the bicameral period as superior in some way (more efficiency and transparancy
because of unquestioned obedience and unequivocal directness of speech in
bicameral mentality).  Ad 3, this seems to be a valid point, but such
synthesizing has its place in science, as Dennett (1986) remarks:

\begin{quote}
If we are going to use this top-down approach, we are going to have to be bold.
We are going to have to be speculative, but there is good and bad speculation,
and this is not an unparalleled activity in science.
\end{quote}

Now for the actual criticism of Jones. The first criticism is that
consciousness is represented as a descriptive metaphor when describing our
current condition, but as a generative metaphor when talking of its genesis.
The descriptive metaphor supplies us with our mental vocabulary, the generative
metaphor allegedly led to the very genesis of consciousness. According to Jones
metaphors can only describe similarities already present. But here he is making
the crucial and grave error of treating metaphor as a simile (Searle 1979). The
evocative power of figurative speech in my opinion flatly contradicts the view
that metaphors can only be descriptive.

The second criticism seems to be a misinterpretation of the unconscious state
of mind as `purely signal-bound.' This appears to be a behavioristic straw-man
argument. After demonstrating, in the first chapter, that consciousness is not
necessary for all problem solving, memory and learning, it is merely a misleading
appeal to intuition to say that preconscious man would have to operate only
on associations and external signals. The bicameral voices would have
intervened precisely because being signal-bound would not suffice in early
civilizations. Bicameral man would rather be voice-bound, unable to question
the authority of his voices. Bicamerality is a compartmentalized mind with
message passing instead of integrative consciousness. As such bicamerality is
conceivably a prior and intermediate stage in the development of consciousness.

\subsection{Consciousness and the concept of consciousness}
Block's criticisms (1981, 1995a) hinge on the preconception that it is
possible to be conscious without having the concept of consciousness, and that
Jaynes's thesis has only pointed to the development of the latter. So it
comes down to:

\begin{quote}
``Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does
phenomenal consciousness fit?'' -- Block (1995b)
\end{quote}

Ignoring for the moment the insinuation that consciousness might be a disease,
we seem to have a valid question here: either consciousness is a social
construction, based on concepts (which need not be conscious, as argued
before), or consciousness is a natural kind, as Block would have it. In the
first case it is generally accepted that it would be impossible to have the
social phenomenon without the concept (eg., using money without the concept of
money is impossible), as argued by Dennett (1986). So if consciousness is 
indeed a social construction then Jaynes's thesis is an empirical matter, the
only potential pitfall being the off-chance that ancient societies were
conspiring to hide their development of consciousness.

Block's position is thus that consciousness must be a natural kind. His
strategy is to brand the idea of the recent development of consciousness as
`ridiculous,' `obviously' false, etc.\ (Block, 1995a). The appeal to intuition
and prejudice is the Achilles heel of his argument, reminiscent of Searle's
(1980) Chinese room argument. Sleutels (2005) describes it thus:

\begin{quote}
``What is most remarkable about Block's argument against the possibility of non-
conscious human minds is its absence -- the paucity of argument and the
proportionate appeal to the reader's intuitions'' -- Sleutels (2006)
\end{quote}

Block's position is that phenomenal consciousness, `what it is like' to be an
animal (whatever that means, see Churchland \& Churchland (1997) for a
critique), does not depend on culture. Concerning access-consciousness,
corresponding better to Jaynes's view of consciousness -- but by definition also
present in animals according to Block, that it is a basic biological feature:

\begin{quote}
``Could there have been a time when humans who are biologically the same as us
never had the contents of their perceptions and thoughts poised for free use in
reasoning or in rational control of action?  Is this ability one that culture
imparts to us as children? Could it be that until we acquired the concept of
`poised for free use in reasoning or in rational control of action', none of
our perceptual contents were A-conscious?  Again, there is no reason to take
such an idea seriously. Very much lower animals are A-conscious, presumably
without any such concept" -- (Block, 1995a, p. 238) as quoted in Sleutels (2006)
\end{quote}

This is again reminiscent of Searle's hand-waving biological naturalism viz.,
look at our special causal powers! The claim that lower animals are A-conscious
is empirical, but not substantiated. Such arm-chair philosophizing by retorical
intimidation is merely the imposition and extension of modern mental categories
to ancient times, of which Jaynes warns throughout his book. There is no reason
to take consciousness for granted as a natural kind, however difficult it may
be to imagine that this common-sense understanding is wrong. Rather like
eternal Platonic species became untenable when Darwin put forth his theory of
evolution, consciousness as a given should be eliminated.

\subsection{Schizophrenia as vestige of the bicameral mind}
Jaynes (1976) presents schizophrenia as one of the `vestiges of the bicameral
mind': a partial relapse into the now defunct mentality of the bicameral mind.
The argument for this is the nature of the voices heard by schizophrenia
patients. These voices often demand to be obeyed, precisely the way bicameral
society would have required. Furthermore schizophrenia is accompanied with
a breakdown of identity and the analog `I' -- which were allegedly formed
after the breakdown of the bicameral mind.

This thesis squares well with his archeological interpretations, but not with
current views on the origins of schizophrenia. Recent findings (Khaitovich
2008) suggest that schizophrenia is a costly by-product of brain
evolution.  Specifically, the evolution of brain metabolism, which has been
pushed to its limits in order to develop our present cognitive abilities.

I would go as far to say that the views of Jaynes are somewhat anti-psychiatry.
He suggests that medication might be given not for the patient, but for the
hospital to eliminate the rival control of hallucinated voices. The
interpretation that schizophrenia is an adaptation to previous times
dangerously relativizes the obviously negative experience of mental illness in
general. That patients of mental ilnesses are maladjusted to modern society is
a truism, but whether a thoroughly disabling mental ilness could represent a
relapse to other forms of society is a stretch at best.

\section{Support}
Aside from the classical works on consciousness as a social construction
(Vygotsky 1986; Mead 1934), and works on ancient mentality (Snell 1953), there
are also some less obvious contemporary connections, which I will now attempt
to sketch.

%link bicameralism with egocentric speech of vygotsky!
%perhaps turn this into the major research question.

%\subsection{Dennett}
%Dennett (1991; 1992) has been the most upfront in supporting Jaynes's general
%claim of consciousness as a social construction.

\subsection{Donald}
Donald (2001), in his own book on the evolution of consciousness, seems to 
portray Jaynes as belonging to the representational school: that we can only
be conscious of language, or symbolic thought, and that thought is made
possible by a language-specific module. But Jaynes stresses that language is
responsible for the {\em installation} of consciousness\footnote{It is not
without some reluctance that I introduce this functionalist metaphor. I am
still unsure whether Dennett's functionalism was shared by Jaynes, the
attention to neuroscience seems to speak against this.}, after which we can
summon completely non-symbolic matters to our mind's I (or ear), such as music
and imagery. Language is necessary for the transmission of metaphors construing
our concept of mind and self, the mental imagery it makes possible need not be
linguistic. His view is further distinguished from consciousness-as-language by
the fact that it implies that language is possible without having
consciousness.

The second citation of Jaynes is positive, acknowledging his priority over
Lakoff \& Johnson in defining thought as largely metaphorical. It strikes me
that generally Donald's views seem so compatible to those of Jaynes: the strong
role of culture, imitation and mythology, and the reliance of external memory
(writing) leading to the cognitive explosion of behavioral modernity.

\subsection{Blackmore}
Blackmore (2003) defends the view that consciousness is an illusion, ie., it
exists but is not what it appears to be, passed on through memes, ideas that
are replicated through imitation. Only humans have consciousness, because only
humans are capable of imitation with high fidelity. The difference with other
views such as those of Donald and Jaynes is that in this view consciousness is
both parasitic and malign: it is propagated for the survival of memes, and
leads humans to egoism, grief etc. Aside from this difference the theory of
memetics provides an excellent framework for viewing consciousness as a social
construction, with memes as a vehicle for Baldwinian evolution -- cultural
evolution influencing biology.

%Presumably, language evolved from purely concrete signals towards more 
%abstract usage. From the immediately present and later spatially and
%temporally displaced there would have occurred a transition introducing
%fiction, story telling, narrative. Jaynesian consciousness comes in when the
%story telling advances past the level of mythology and is recognized as
%fiction. This opens the way for human cunning, deception and dissimulation.

%Neurophilosophy, Merlin Donald, Edelman etc?

%Link with social intelligence hypothesis: consc. developed because of increase in group size.

%begin new
%Also: connection with existentialism: self as narrative, embodiment etc.
%But: should be existentialism minus the anti-physicalism
\subsection{Grounding in naturalism}
Although bicameralism seems an exceedingly rare hypothesis, the reluctance to
take it serious seems to stem from certain philosophical assumptions, and
not scientific counter-evidence. Philosophical accounts of consciousness often
attempt to treat it as a subject resisting scientific scrutiny, in order to
guard it as the ultimate philosophical question and keep it within their own
methodological province. Props for this attempt include such monstrous ideas as
philosophical zombies, epiphenomenal qualia and non-physical mental realms.
Such conceptions (or perhaps contraptions) of consciousness are often radically
sollipsistic, when in fact it is quite obvious how much consciousness is a
social phenomenon intuitively attributed to conspecifics.

In complete opposition to such sophistry stands naturalism, which grants
priority to science for all questions. Talk of zombies, qualia and mental
realms can be eliminated when scientific results are taken serious and used
to form a philosophy continuous with science. A philosophy of mind must grant
primacy to the role of the body, the physical vessel for conscious agents.
Eliminativism with respect to mind as a category perfectly complements
embodiment in stressing the role of the body as physical. By rejecting the myth
of the givenness of `mental facts,' consciousness can also be re-interpreted as
a phenomenon which, far from being natural and expected in certain organisms,
actually demands an explanation for how and why it came to be. Acquired
consciousness as a social construct fits well with naturalism, because it
requires only minimal assumptions about `minds' and their native capabilities.

By eliminating first-person perspectives as a natural category, their
veridicality is stripped away from them. The first-person perspective needs
to be constructed on top of the objective and purely physical. The perfect tool
for this is language. Language is able to transport the gist of someone's
perspective to others. Even though a story always presents an equivocation to
some extent, it presents a huge gain over directly observing uninterpreted
physical events. 

%end new
 
\section{Conclusion}
In my opinion consciousness as a social construction is a good compromise
between explaining it away or reducing it to sensation, and between denying it
and assuming it as a given. Jaynes's views on consciousness are seen as
idiosyncratic largely because of the neurological model and specific dating of
the emergence of consciousness. The view that consciousness is based on
language and emerged somewhere in time as a cultural phenomenon does not seem
as contentious, as it has a variety of proponents defending it.

Jaynes's views on consciousness stand up well with respect to the findings of
modern neuroscience. His hypothesis on the bicameral mind however, seems hard
to substantiate neurologically, leaving only the plethora of fragmentary
archeological and philological evidence. The claimed vestiges of the bicameral
mind invoke hypnotism, hallucinations and possession -- phenomena of which
naturalism demands to steer clear. On the other hand the focus on evidence
rather than intuitions is a strong point. The speculative interpretations are
inevitable, yet predictions about future findings are still open to
falsification, or perhaps vindication.
%Yet the thesis does make predictions: [namely?]


%Hypnotism, Jaynes argues, is culturally defined by the so-called collective
%cognitive imperative of the day. When Mesmer claimed magnets could control
%behavior, it did `wonders.' When later it was said that after hypnosis no trace
%is left in memory of what happened, suddenly everyone did forget what had
%happened during the hypnosis. This appears to be a pervasive placebo effect,
%yet impossible to control for. After all, how could one manipulate the
%collective cognitive imperative for the sake of experiment? Is the world too
%dynamic to study these phenomena? This seems to suggest a certain defeatism
%towards understanding phenomenology. Any explanation inevitably exposes itself
%to the risk of being accused of employing circular, self-fulfilling metaphors.

\section{Bibliography}
%turn off bold for labels (all bow to magic incantations!)
%\renewcommand{\descriptionlabel}[1] {\hspace{\labelsep}#1}

\begin{description}
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%\item[Clark, Andy] (1998), ``The Magic of Words'' in Carruthers \& Boucher
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%Kathleen Baynes, Michael S. Gazzaniga Lateralization of language: Toward a biologically based model of language. The Linguistic Review. Volume 22, Issue 2-4, Pages 303-326, ISSN (Online) 1613-3676, ISSN (Print) 0167-6318, DOI: 10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.303, 12/12/2005

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%\item[Kuijsten, M.] (2007), ``Consciousness, Hallucinations, and the Bicameral
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