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{Andreas van Cranenburgh\footnote{\texttt{andreas@unstable.nl}, 0440949}, \today} \\
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\section*{Are genes ruling our world?}

%unit of selection: selfish genes vs. multiple levels
Neodarwinism (eg., Dawkins 1976) posits that the sole driving force of
evolution is the selection of genes. Individuals, species, even whole
ecosystems are mere pawn and chessboard for the gene's struggle for domination.
While it is undoubtedly commendable to counter any residual anthropocentrism and
teleology in a scientific account of life, it appears to me as a tunnel vision.

The alternative is natural selection ocurring on multiple levels concurrently.
The relevant levels include the genetic, cellular, indivudual and species
level. Such a theory is put forward by Varela et.\ al (1991), as part of a
larger philosophical reorganization of science. Their argument is that the
traditional, neodarwinistic account relies on presupposed optimum, towards
which evolution naturally converges, given time. However, presupposing such an
optimum seems to beg the question of how this optimum came about. Life may be
molded by evolution into an ever more optimal and complex vessel for its genes,
but such a story fails to account for the world which is the stage of life.

This problem can be remedied by taking into account how life and the world
mutually influence each other, and by noting how there are multiple levels of
natural selection which are dynamically influencing each other. The `optimal'
path for evolution is laid down by the interaction of life and world itself, as
in laying down a path in walking.

A clear example of the neodarwinistic complacency in the power of genes is the
attempted reduction of altruism to genetic factors through the notion of
inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964). Through sophisticated mathematics it has
been possible to demonstrate that it is advantageous for the survival of genes
to have individuals act in an altruistic manner, provided that the exchange is
between people who have shared genes (ie., family members). Brothers share 50\%
of their genes, so rescuing one's brother helps this 50\% of genes survive
better. This is obviously a convincing account of altruism, a phenonomenon
which had previously been a problem for selfish explanations of behaviour. The
problem is, however, that it only explains altruism on one level, the level of
genes. It says nothing about an individual's reasons for altruism, eg.\
avoiding feelings of guilt, desiring reciprocity, kindness, etc. In fact the
only thing which is explained is that for a genetically determined version of
altruism, there is a possible route through natural selection for such a trait
to survive.

It is not possible, of course, to claim that acts of kindness have now been
reduced to genetics. For every form of behavior it is possible to give an
explanation in terms of the genes' tendency to reproduction, but this hardly
helps with understanding the motivation for that behavior, because genes are
neither conscious nor making decisions.

I claim that to fully explain behavior there needs to be an individual having
grown, evolved and attuned dynamically with its surroundings, drifting in some
direction determined together by its genes, environment and self. This picture
is much less neat and ordered, of course, but such is the price of
completeness!

\subsection*{References}
Dawkins, Richard (1976), ``The Selfish Gene''

Hamilton, W. D. (1964) ``The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I and II,'' J. Theor. Biol. v7, pp 1-16, and 17-52.

Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., \& Rosch, E. (1991), ``The Embodied Mind: Cognitive
Science and Human Experience." Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


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